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Some Fire Insurance Problems.
An ever increasingly important field of commercial
activity is insurance. Upon reference to the reports of
the insurance departments of the various states, one is
amazed at the immense volume of business and assets of
insurance companies.
The importance of the subject is reflected in the records of our decisional law.
Fire insurance presents some interesting problems.
A contract of fire insurance is said to be a contract of indemnity, the -insurer agreeing for a consideration to indemnify the person insured against a loss which he may
There must, by this definisustain by fire destruction.
tion of necessity, be an interest in the property, the subject matter of the insurance.
Says Richard on Insurance':
"At the very outset, it must ibe noted that insurance is essentially a contract of indemnity, and
that from this cardinal principle arise many of
1

3rd. Ed. Page 27.

DICKINSON

LAW REVIEW

its, distinctive characteristics, such as the rule requiring an insurable interest, the doctrine of
double insurance contribution, and the right of
subrogation accruing on settlement of a loss."
As early as 1803, we find our Supreme Court per
Yeates, J., referring to the British Statute of 19 Geo. 2,
c. 37, passed in 1746, and intended to put an end to insur2
ances without real interest, using this language :
"We have adopted the policy and principles
which gave rise to the act of parliament, both in
courts of justice and by commercial usage: but we
are not prepared to say that every particular provision or resolution under it, has been engrafted
into our system of law. An insurance amongst us,
is a contract of indemnity. Its object is, not to make
a positive gain but to avert a possib~e loss. A man
can never be said to be indemnified against a loss
which can never happen to him. There cannot be
an indemnity ivithout a loss, nor a loss without an
interest.
A policy therefore miade without interest, is a "wager policy," and has nothing in
1
common with insurance, but name and form.
Marsh, 30, 97".
INSURABLE INTEREST.
Any legal or equitable estate, or any right which may
be prejudicially effected, or any liability which may be
brought into operation, by a fire, will confer an insurable
interest.3
The following language from Wood on Insurance, sec. 266, P. 493, was quoted with approval by
Green, J., in Farmers -and Mechanics' Insurance Company vs. Mecker :4
2Pritchett vs. Insurance-Co., 3 Yeates 459. (1803.)
3Richards on Insurance, P. 32, 3rd Ed.
410 W. N. C. 306. (1881.) and cases cited.
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"It is not necessary that the ;assured should
have either a legal or an equitable interest or indeed any property interest in the subject matter
insured. It is enough if he holds such a relation
to the property, that its destruction by the peril
insured against involves pecuniary loss to him or
those for whom he acts. It need not be an existing jus in re nor jus ad rem."
Amy interest in real estate may be the subject matter of the insurance; i. e. vendor, vendee, mortgagor,
mortgagee,
lessor, lessee, life tenant and remainderman.
4
a.

VENDOR AND VENDEE..
A, the owner in fee of premises, agreed by contract
of sale to convey at a future day the legal title of the premises in question to B. the latter agreeing to pay for the
same a stipulated price at the time of conveyanee. Before
the arrival of the day of performance the premises were
destroyed by fire. The risk of loss was said to be upon the
vendee and he was compelled to accept the conveyance and
pay the stipulated price, despite the reduction in value
of the premises by reason of the casualty of fire.5
Says Tiffany :6
"On the making of an executory contract for
the safe of land, of which specific performance
would be decreed, a court of equity, regarding as
done that which ought to be done, thereafter considers the equitable estate as vested in the pur4
aA Judgment creditor has not insurable interest. Grevemyer
vs. Ins. Co., 62 Pa. 342 (1869) but see Light vs. Ins. Co. 169 Pa.
310. (1895.)
5
Insurance Co. vs. Updegraff, 21 Pa. 513. (1853) Reed vs. Lu-

kens, 44 Pa. 200. (1863.)

'Real Property z64.
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chaser, unless an intention to the contrary appears, and the vendor is regarded as holding the
legal title in trust for the benefit of the purchaser,
of
while the purchaser is regarded as the trustee
7
the vendor for the unpaid purchase money."
In Insurance Co. vs. Updegraff8 , A sold premises to
B, the latter taking possession and agreeing to pay stipulated sums per annum,
the title to .be retained by A
until full payment.
A affected insurance against loss
by fire, informing the company of the above contract.
The insurance covered both the legal and equitable estates and was for the purpose of protecting vendee as
well as vendor.
The premises were totally destroyed
by fire and this 'action was .brought by A to the use of
B against the company for the recovery of the amount of
the policy.
The defence was that the lot of ground was
sufficient security for the unpaid purchase money and
that the insured had no insurable interest beyond this.
Upon judgment for the full amount of the p6licy error
was assigned to the Supreme Court, which after referring to the equitable doctrine of trusteeship between vendor and vendee and the latters liability to pay for a house
destroyed by fire after the contract, declared, per Lewis,
3T.:
"Following the spirit of these decisions, the
courts will make no presumptions, in the case of
an insurance by the vendor, that it Was his intention, in the event of a loss, that the vendee should
bear not only the measure of it which fell upon
him by the acident, but that he should also indemnify the insurance company. On the contrary,
as the vendor is a trustee for the vendee every act
of his in relation to the estate will be presumed to
be for the benefit of the vendee, subject of course,
7

Kerr vs. Day. 14 Pa. 112. (1850.) Per Bell, J.
821 Pa. 513. (1853.)
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to the prior claims of the vendor himself. This
is reasonable, because, as the vendee must suffer
the losses which may happen to the property, it is
just that he should have the advantage of any
benefits which accrue to it; and, next to the security of his own interest, a trustee will be presumed
to have in view the interest of the cestui que trust.
Although the vendor is not bound to insure, or
even to continue 'an insurance already made, 'he
may, like any other trustee having the legal title,
insure if he thinks proper, to the -fullvalue of the
property: 1 Arnold 259: 2 B. & P. N. R. 324. It
is true that in the case of a mortgagee of a ship he
can o9-y recover to the extent of his mortgage
debt, unless it appears that in effecting the insurance, he intended to cover, not his own interest
only, but that of the mortgagor also: 2 B. & Ad.
193:
1 Moody & Rob. 153. If he intended to
cover the whole interest, both legal and equitable,
he may recover the whole amount of the insurance
under a trust, as to the surplus, to hold it for the
mortgagor:
Carothers vs. Sheddon. 6 Taunt,
17: 1 Arnold 252. The same rule applies to the
case of an insurance by a vendor. There is this difference, however, that as the whole estate is at
law in the vendor, and the vendee has only a title
to go into equity, the insurance company cannot
assert the rights of the latter, or go into equity
in respect to them, except upon principles of equity
and -good conscience."
Ten years 'after the above remarks were uttered the
case of Reed vs. Lukens 9 arose and these were the essential facts.
A entered into a contract to sell his farm to B, title
to pass the succeeding April 2nd. Before the latter date
944 Pa. 200. (1863:) 84 Amer. Dec. 425.
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the barn upon the premises was destroyed by fire. A
had the barn insured for what ap peared to be $300, but
the sum later was found to be $900, as was admitted by
The insurance had been effectthe insurance company.
ed before the contract of sale and according to the agreed
-fctsthere appeared to have been no mention of the insurance in the contract. However, when the parties met on
April 2nd to consummate the sale, the vendor assigned
the policy, containing likewise the insurance on the buildings, to the vendee, which was understood to embrace the
claian of the vendor against the insurance company for
loss of the barn, then assumed to be and designated as
$300. After the conveyance and the assignment, it was
discovered that the amount due from the company was
$900. This was an amicable action in the nature of an
interpleader and upon an agreed statement of facts, to
determine the right to the balance of $600, whether the
vendor was entitled or the vendee. Butler, P. J. for the
lowe - Court (Delaware County,) specifically placed the
right of recovery of the vendee upon the fact that the
policy, together with the claim of the vendor against the
insurance company for the loss of the barn, had been assigned by the vendor to the vendee, saying:
"This assignment transferred all possible interest in this contract, and all benefit and -advantage to be derived therefrom. Such a transfer
necessarily included as well the money then due
on the policy, as what might thereafter accrue."
That statement was prefaced, however, by a discussion concerning the relation of vendor and vendee, which
has placed Reed vs. Lukens in the category of leading
cases.
Inter alia, the learned court declared:
"On the execution of the contract of sale, the
plaintiff 'became, in equity, the owner of the property, the defendant holding it thereafter as his
trustee, with right to retain it until the purchase
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money should be paid. Whatever advantage might
thereafter 'ariseto it would be the plaintiff's and
whatever loss might befall it, he must sustain; the
defendant had no further interest in it, except
as security for the purchase money; he would
neither lose nor gain by any change which might
occur to it: Siter, James & Co's. App. 2 Casey.
When, therefore, the barn was burned, it was the
Vlaintiff's property that was destroyed; defendant
lost nothing; the plaintiff was still obliged to take
the property and pay the purchase money.
The insurance company, however, became liable to
pay for the loss to the defendant because as is said in
Updegraff vs. Insurance Co., 9 Harris, 513, he, as respects third persons, not privy to the contract of sale, is
But
still to be regarded as the owner of the property.
as between himself and the plaintiff the property was not
his, but the plaintiffs; he could not appropriate to himself
the money which the insurance company became liable
to pay on that -acount; he had the property in trust, and
the right which accrued in consequence of its destruction, took its place, was held in the same way, and liable
to be enforced in a court of equity. This would seem to
be the plain result of the principles governing the relations between these parties established by the contract
of sale."
The Supreme Court 'affirmed the judgmentPer Curiam, "for the reasons given by the learned Judge
below."
The remarks already quoted from Insurance Co., vs.
Updegraff' 0 were obviously not essential under the
facts of the case and it is likewise clear that the remarks of the learned trial judge in Reed vs. Lukens 1
.above set forth were not necessary in determining the
Howquestion of ownership of the fund in dispute.
1021 Pa. 513, (1853.)

1144 Pa. 200, (1863.)
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ever, within five years following the determination of
Reed vs. Lukens we\ .find the Supreme Court in Hill vs.
C. V. Mutual Protection Co.12 reciting, per Thompson, C.
J., the discussions of law in Insurance Co. vs. Updegraff
and Reed vs. Lukens with approval, adding "But this is
rather a digression," the only point to be determined in
this case having been whether a vendor, after a contract
of sale Of the insured premises, but before its consummation by conveyance, was still the owner within the meaning of the policy and entitled to recover the same a loss
sustained before conveyance. It was held that the facts
were not in violation of the alienation clause in the policy. In Insurance Co. vs. Graybill, 13 real estate of a decedent, the buildings on which were insured in the defendant company, was sold by order of Orphans' Court
but before confirmation of the sale the buildings were
destroyed by fire.
The Company had not assented to
the sale. It was held the sale was not such an alienation
as to avoid the policy and the administrator could recover thereon for the use of the assignee of the vendee
-towhom the vendee had assigned his interest in the purchase prior to the fire. Said Sharwood, 3.:
"It is clear both upon principle and authority,
that by sale of the premises insured under the proceedings in the Orphans Court, there was no such
dienation before confirmation as avoided the policy; and the loss having occurred between the sale
and the confirmation, the legal title was then in
the heirs of Forney, and the action on the policy
was rightly brought in the name of the administrator to the use of the vendee: Insurance Co.,
vs. Updegraff, 9 Harris 513: Reed vs. Lukens,
8 Wright 200: Hill vs. Cumberland Valley Mutual
Protection Co., 9 P. F. Smith 474."
1259 Pa. 474, (1868.)
1374 Pa. 17, (1873.)
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In Parcell vs. Grosses 4 A made a contract of s~le
with B for certain premises, B, took possession-but received no deed, the title being retained by A as security
for the unpaid purchase money and B was given two
years in which to pay the same.
A policy of fire insurance upon the buildjing in the name of A it was agreed
should be held as collateral security for the payment of
the purchase money.
Later, in -an action by the vendor
against the vendee for the balance of the purchase money, the vendee set up inter alia as a defense that through
the negligence of A, the policy had become avoided and
that during this avoidance, the premises were destroyed
by fire and that B thus sustained a loss through the negligence of A. It was held that this was a, good defense to
A's claims, as the proceeds of the policy, had it been kept
alive, would have been held in equity-by A as trustee for
B. Sterrett, J., refers in his opinion with approval to
the cases of Insurance Company vs. Updegraff, Reed vs.
Lukens and Hill vs. The Cumberland Valley Mutual Protection Company which have already been discussed.
ENGLISH CASES.
In the English case of Rayner vs. Preston'15 , the
facts were as follows: the plaintiffs purchased from the
defendants a messuage and workshops. Between the
date of the contract and the time fixed for completion,
the buildings purchased were damaged by fire.
The
vendors had before the contract insured the buildings
against fire but no mention of this fact or of the policy.
was made in the contract of sale. The plaintiffs brought
this action to establish their right to the sum received
,by vendors from the insurance office or to have the sum
appied towards reinstating the buildings damaged. The
Master of the Rolls decided against the claim and this pro"4109 Pa. 617. (1885.)
See Collins vs. Assurance Corporation.
25L. R. 18 Ch. D. 1. (1881.)

165 Pa. 298. (1895.)
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ceeding was an appeal to the Supreme Court of Judicature."0
It was held that the plaintiffs could not recover.
Brett, L. J., after distinguishing between the subject
matter of insurance, viz; the house, and the subject matter of the contract of insurance, viz; money, thus continues:
"In this case, there was a contract of insur
ance made between the defendants and the insurance company. CThat a contract was made by
the defendants, not on behalf of any undisclosed
principal, not on behalf of any one interested other
than themselves. The contract was made by the
defendants sola'y -and entirely on their own behalf, and at a time when they had no relation of
any kind with the plaintiffs."
Repudiating the dictum that the relation between
vendor and vendee is that of trustee and cestui que trust,
the learned Justice concludes:
"As I have said, the contract of insurance is
a mere personal contract for the payment of money. It is not a contract which runs with the land.
If it were, there ought to be a decree that upon the
completion of the purchase, the policy be handed
over. But that is not the law. The contract of
insurance does not run with the land; it is a mere
personal contract, and unless it is assigned, no
suit or action can be maintained upon it except
between the original parties to it."
James, L. J. strongly dissented from the majority
view and took issue directly on the question of the trust,
holding that the relation between the vendor and vendee
was that of trustee and cestui que trust, saying, inter
alia:
16Facts taken from Richards Cases on Insurance, page 58.
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"It is ascertained that while the legal estate
was in the vendor, the beneficial or equitable interest was wholly in the purchaser.
And that,
in my opinion, is the correct definition of a trust
estate. Wherever that state of things occurs,
whether by act of the -parties or by act or operation of law, whether it is ascertained from the
first or after a period of suspiense and uncertainity,
then there is a complete and perfect trust, the
legal owner is, and has been a trustee, and the
beneficial owner is, and has been a cestui que
trust."
From this premise, the learned Justice reached the
conclusion that the policy of insurance valid only because
it is related closely to the subject matter of the trust can
not be collateral, but is directly connected with the legal
ownership of the property.
The benefit occurring by
reason of such legal ownership of the vendor must be
taken by him as trustee for the beneficial owner.
The result of the judgment of the Court was to give
the vendor, not only the benefit of his contract with the
vendee, but likewise the benefit of the contract made by
the vendor with the insurance company.' However, the
enjoyment of the vendor of the fruits of his victory was
shortlived for two years later, the English Court held in
Castellain vs. Preston 17 that the underwriter was entitled
to be subrogated to the rights of the vendor against the
vendee, the principle being quoted in these words:
"The general rule of law (and it is obvious
justice) is that where there is a contract of indemnity, (it matters not whether it is a marine
policy or a policy against fire on land or any other
contract of indemnity,) and a loss happens, anything which reduces or diminishes that loss reduces or diminishes the amount which the indemni17L. R. 11 Q. B. D. (380.) (1883.)
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fier is bound to pay; and if the indemnifier has
already paid it, then if anything which diminishes
the loss comes into the hands of the person to
'whom he has paid it, it becomes an equity that the
person who has already paid the full indemnity is
entitled to be recouped by having that amount
back."
Accordingly it was held that the underwriter was
entitled to judgment against *the vendor to the amount,
not exceeding of course the policy, which the vendor had
8
1
received from the vendee.

DIVERGENT RULES
Four rules for determining the ultimate rights of
vendor and vendee in the fire insurance proceeds appear
from a reading of the reports.
First, the English rule that the vendor may recover
from the company on a piiicy held by him and that he
does not hold the proceeds as trustee for the vendee but
for his own benefit, the contract of insurance being a
personal one and not running with the title to the land.
However, ,by applying the doctrine of indemnity the English courts accord to the underwriter the right of subrogation, consequently if the vendee performs his contract
with the vendor, it is to the relief of the insurance company and the vendee is the ultimate loser. Relative to
the application of subrogation in the above rule, Richard
propounds this query: 19
"Suppose both vendor and vendee are willing
to call off their pending contract and take a fresh
start, may they not do so? If they may, then the
companies right of subrogation would seem to be
valueless and wholly subject to defeat by joint
action of vendor and vendee."
13
See also Railroad Company vs. Pullman Car Company 139
United States, 79, 88. (1890.)
19General Principles of Insurance Law, 3rd Ed. 67, note.
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Second, the rule as enunciated in Phinizy vs. Guernsey 20 , giving the proceeds of the policy to the vendor on
the theory that the loss or destruction of the premises before consummation of contract of sale by vendee taking
po.3session or if something remains to be done by the Vendor to perfect his title at the time of destruction the loss
falls upon the vendor and not upon the vendee, thus modifying the general rule of liability as established by our
Pa. cases. It was held in this case, however, that where
there was a binding contract of sale and destruction of
the premises by fire without the vendor's fault, a court of
equity will, at the instance of the vendee, compel a specific performance of the contract, and will allow an abatement of the purchase price in .such an amount as is just
and reasonable in view of the changed condition of the
property. But where the property has been substantially
damaged or nmaterially changed between the date of the
contract and the time when the vendor offers to convey,
the courts wilf not decree a specific performance of the
contract at the instance of the vendor unless possibly
where the vendee has already taken possession.
Referring to our cases of Insurance Co. vs. Updegraff and
Reed vs. Lukens, the Georgia Court says:
"It has been held in some cases that when a
contract of sale is so far completed that the vendor
is to be treated as the trustee of the vendee, the
vendor would also hold in trust for the vendee a
policy of insurance which was on the property at
the time the contract was made; and that if a loss
by fire occurred between the date of the contract
and the time fixed for the delivery of the deed, the
vendor would be compelled to account to the vendee for the insurance money collected on the policy, as he was in equity the owner of the property
at the time of the fire and the -lossfell upon him."
20111

Ga. 346, (1900); 78 Amer. St. Rep. 207.

268
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In Phinizy vs. Guernsey, it may be noted, there was
five dollars paid when the written agreement was signed,
the stipulation being that the balance of the purchase
money was to be paid when the vendee should satisfy
himself that the vendor's title to the property was good
and it was further agreed that when the property was
conveyed in accordance with the terms of the contract
the policies of insurance were to be assigned to the yendee.
Third, the rule of Reed vs. Luken. as already set
forth holding that the vendor as trustee for the vendee
must account to the vendee for the proceeds of the insurance policies.21

Fourth, the rule of Clinton vs. Insurance

C0.22

that

the vendee is not entited to insurance taken by the vendor, unless it is shown to have been for the benefit of the
vendee. The facts of this case would indicate that the
court's view was somewhat similar to that of Phinizy vs.
Guernsey as specific performance could not be compelled
against the vendee. Moreover the right of subrogation
of the insurance company was denied and the effect was
to give the proceeds of the policy to the vendor without
accountability to the vendee.22
REMARKS.
Although the trustee doctrine of Reed vs. Lukens
was apparently unnecessary to the determination of the
case and in fact no Pennsylvania case has been found referring to this doctrine which is not susceptible of decision on other 'grounds it 4s clear from the quotations
given that our Courts have thoroughly approved of and
adopted the doctrine and this is recognized in text books,
reports and comments upon leading decisions23.
It is
difficult however, to reconcile the doctrine with the prin2lSee also Williams vs. Lilly, 67 Conn. 50. (1895).
2245 N. Y. 465. (1871.)
2-Richards, P. 75; 84 Amer. Dec. 425; 78 Amer. St. Rep. 216;
37 L. R. A. 150, 153 n.; 50 L. R. A. 683.
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ciple in insurance law that the contract is a personal one
and with the clause in the etandard fire policy against alienation. 24 Furthermore, it is admitted in the cases that
the vendor is under no duty, aside from his contract, to
25
take out insurance or to renew a policy that expires.
The difficulty has been created by the adoption of the
equitable principle of conversion and the consequent risk
of loss imposed upon a vendee following the 'agreement
of sale.
But why should the risk of loss be imposed upon a vendee, not in possesion, and who -has no control
whatsoever over the premises? The rule is different in
the case of personal property 6 and it affords the vendee
of real estate small comfort to be saddled with the loss
upon the -fiction that he is the actual owner and that res
perit domino app'ies. In the effort to avoid the consequences of this theory the vendor is made a trustee of the
proceeds of a contract, personal to him ,by its very terms,
for which ex hypothesi the vendee has paid nothing and
in fact of which no mention was made at the time of the
agreement.
The other horn of the dilemma of course
would be to give the proceeds absolutely to the vendor or
eventually via subrogation to the insurance company,
neither of which results is desirable.
If, however, the contract of sale is recognized merely
as a means by which through specific performance, if
necessary, the vendee may -at some future time 'become
the owner of the premises by the pefformance of the conditions of sale, meanwhile the vendor remaining, as he
'actualiy is, the owner, the risk would remain upon the
latter and the principles of personal and real property
sales in this respect would be the same. The vendor
would thus be entitled to the insurance money and bonversely would not be entitled to specific performance un24Grant vs. Insurance Co. 76 Me. 514. Richards, P. 75.
25Skinenr vs. Houghton, 92 Md. 68; 84 Amer. St. Rep. 485.
See however, Parcell vs. Grosser, 109 Pa. 617. (1885.)
26
The Risk of Loss, Williston, 9 Harv. L. R. 106.
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less he could perform fully on his part, which is obviously
an implied condition of his contract. The vendee could
have the option of accepting the insurance money in lieu
of the building destroyed or agreeing in any other way to
the changed situation.
Thus, it is submitted, the incongruous results of our
cases would be avoided and the true facts recognized
permit the application of the accepted principles of insurance.
The present condition of our Pe. law on this subject
may be thus summarized.
(1) A contract of sale of the insured premises does
not violate the terms of the policy against alienation and
the interest of the vendor in the policies extant continues.27
(2) A contract of sale of the insured, premises is
sufficient to vest in the vendee an insurable interest as
"the sole and unconditional owner." within- the terms of
the standard ipoicy. 28
(3) The vendor may insure simply his interest as
vendor or strictly for 'his own benefit but where this
-fact is not clear, a strong presumption arises that the insurance is for the benefit of -both legal and equitable es29
tates.
(4) The vendee insuring the premises covers simply
his interest. In case of loss the proceeds of the policy
are the property of the vendee not subject to any trusteeship. so
(5) Insurance money collected by vendor or due him
under -the presumption of (3) is held in trust by vendor
for the benefit of the vendee according to the contract
of sale whether or not the insurance has been mentioned
2

7Chandler v. Ins. Co. 88 Pa. 233, (1879.)
ins. Co. vs. Dunham, 117 Pa. 460, (1888.)
P. and L. Dig.
Dec. Vol. 9, col. 14837, citing Reed and Gukens, 44 Pa. 200 (1863)
and other cases.
29
1ns. Co. vs. Repdegroff, 21 Pa. 513, (1853.)
3
OHeller vs. Ins. Co. 177 Pa. 262, (1896); 34 L. R. A- 600.
28
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in the articles or specifically marked for the benefit of
the vendee. 31
(6) A vendee is such -a party in interest to a policy
issued to vendor that he may be use plaintiff in an action
the company
against the company on the policy although
32
had never assented to an assignnment.
A. J. WHITE HUTTON.

S'Reed vs. Lukens, 44 Pa. 200, (1863); P. and L. Dig. Dec.
Vol. 9, col. 15110-11.
32Ins. Co. vs. Graybill, 74 Pa. 17, (1873.)

But see Lumber Co.

vs. Insurance Co. 4 Super. Ct. 100 (1879), Hurley's Est. 13 Phila.
276, (1879.)
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MOOT COURT
WHITE VS. HOLEMAN
Decedent Estates-Debts of Decedent Lien, for One YearAct 1917-AVords "Action Commenced"
STATEMENT OF FACTS
John Holeman died indebted inter alios to White in the sum
of $500. He left a small personal estate. White presented his
claim, proved it and obtained a dividend of $100.00. The administrator, who was present at the distribution proceedings was the
defendant, Win. Holeman, the only heir of John Holeman. White
then obtained an order from the Orphans Court to the Administrator to sell the decedent's land for the payment of debts. The
order was made nine months after the death of Holeman. The
sale was not made until six months thereafter. It was then made,
White becoming the purchaser. This is ejectment to recover the
land.
Marcus for plaintiff.
Meek for defendant.
HERING, J., The facts of the case necessitate an interpretation of the words "Action Commenced" in the fifteenth (15) Section, par. A. of the Fiduciaries Act of 1917. This section of the
Act provides in part as follows: that no debts of a decedent shall
remain a lien on the real estate of such decedent longer than one
year after the death of such debtor, ufiless an action for the
recovery thereof be brought against the executor or administrator of such decedent within said period and that such action shall
be duly prosecuted to judgment, when it shall remain a lien for
five years etc.
The question now arises; did either (1) the proving of the
claim and the receipt of a dividend by White in distribution procedings, or (2) the order of the Orphans Court for the sale of
Holeman's real estate, amount to the legal equivalent of an action commenced within the period of one year as provided by the
act?
We find very little authority on this point since the passage
of the act of 1917, but the effect of this sectiop of the act was
merely to change the law as to the period of time making it one
year instead of two years or five years for proving claims a2 provided for by the earlier acts of 1834, 1893, 1901 and 1909.
We
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can then reason by analogy, using as authority the cases decided
under these previous actt of assembly.
It seems to be a well settled doctrine that the presentation
and proof of a claim on a decedent's estate, before an administrator or executor does not constitute an "action commenced" within
the act of 1834 and acordingly does not extend the lien on the
decedent's real estate; Wilson's Estate '5 W. N. C. 243. After
proving his claim and receiving a dividend, White, nine months
after Holeman's death, secured an order of Court for the sale of
the real estate. The land was not sold, however, until six months
later or fifteen months after decedent's death. These facts bring
the case within the rule as stated in Bindley's Anpeal 69 Pa. 295.
It was decided in that case, that when an order for the sale of
real estate was made within the five years, (the period provided
for by the Act of 1834) but the sale was not made until after the
expiration of that period, the lien of debts was gone as against the
heirs at law, and this too, although the creditor had proved his
claim and had been awarded a dividend in the distribution of another part of the estate. This doctrine is laid down in later
cases viz. Strayer v. Austin, 134 Pa. 96; Emerick's Estate 172 Pa.
191; and Crezer's Estate 257 Pa. 245. Bindley's Appeal was also
held to be good law in the recent cases of In Re Dubosky 253 Fed.
794, and KIRK v. Van Horn et al., Appellants, 265 Pa. 549, decided after the passage of the present act of 1917. The latter case
held that "although the Orphans Court has full authority to adjudicate what debts are owing a decedent, and is given plenary
power to authorize a sale of his lands for the payment of such
debts, and an award in favor of a creditor is not equivalent to
an action under these acts; see also Smith vs. Ribblett 233 Pa. 300.
The leaning of the Courts in the numerous decisions on this
subject has been to favor the heirs and to require of the creditor
the vigilant prosecution of his demand in the mode pointed out
by the acts of assembly. The words of the act are strictly technical and should be received in their technical sense, otherwise
the security and repose of titles in the hands of the heirs and devisees as well as purchasers from them, would be imperiled. We
think, that had the administrator been served by a summons in
assumpsit by White within the period of one year from the decedent's death and had the action subsequently been pursued to
judgment, the act would have been complied with and the lands
could have been sold after the period of one year had expired.
Since White therefore had no lien on the real estate in question, and as it does not appear that there were any other liens
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against the said real estate at the time of the sale, no title passed
by the sale.
We must therefore render JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE
DEFENDANT.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The act of June 7th 1917, called the Fidiciaries Act, declares
that a decedent's debt shall not remain a lien on his real estate
longer than one year after his death, "unless within said period
an action for the recovery thereof be brought against the exeutor or administrator of such decedent" and unless such action be
indexed within said period, in the judgment index in the county
in which the action is brought, and also in the county wherein
the land sought to be charged is situate; and the action must be
duly prosecuted to judgment.
To say that a debt shall not remain a lien, etc., is to say
that for it the land shall not be liable to be sold from the heir:
Bindley's Apeal 69 Pa. 295; Emerick's Estate 172 Pa. 191; Oliver's
Appeal 101 Pa. 299.
The sale took place fifteen months after the decedent's death.
The lien was then lost, unless (a) the fact that the application for
leave to sell and the Orphans Court's order to sell, made within
the year, prolonged the lien or unless (b) the presentation of the
debt, in the distribution of the personal estate and the allowance
on it of a dividend, prolonged the lien.
That the application for leave to sell, and the order to sell,
would not prolong the lien is manifest from Smith vs. Ribblett
233 Pa. 300; Bindley's Appeal 69 Pa. 295; Emerick's Estate 172
Pa. 191.
That the participation within the year in the distribution 6f
any portion of the estate of the deceased did not protract the lien, is
affirmed in Bindley's Appeal, supra.
It follows that no title passed by the sale made fifteen months
after the debtor's death. White the purchaser got nothing.
The sale in Bindley's Appeal was held valid because there was
one debt whose lien had not expired at the time of its making.
The land could be validly sold for one debt whose lien continued,
although in the proceeds, the debts which had lost their lien could
not participate.
The learned court below has made a lucid defense of the conclusion reached by it and its judgment is AFFIRMED.
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BECKLEY VS. JOHNSON
Lease-An Implied Covenant for Quiet Enjoyment-Eviction
Tenant-Measure of Damages to be Recovered by Tenant.

of

STATEMENT OF FACTS
"Johnson let a building and lot to Bickley for 15 years for
$1,000 per year. There was a mortgage on the premises at the
time. After 4 years Johnson decided to sell the property for
$20,000.00, but the buyer insisted on obtaining possession. Johnson then refused to pay interest on the mortgage in order that
the mortgagee might be induced to foreclose. Johnson became
purchaser at the foreclosure sale. He then conveyed to the intended buyer, who consented to Bickley's retention of possession,
and on his agreeing to pay $500 per year more rent than under
the former lease. This is an action for the loss of quiet enjoyment, the damages claimed being $500 times the number of years
the lease had to run, 11 years."
Beck, X, for the plaintiff.
be&k, T, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
BLOOM, J., The facts of this case present for determination the following questions, where a landlord owning property
subject to a mortgage, executes a lease with implied covenant
for quiet enjoyment, and during the term thereof deliberately
instigates, procures, assists and expedites the foreclosing of the
mortgage for his own purposes and profit, with the result that the
property is sold at sheriff sale, and the tenant suffers an eviction
at law, can the tenant recover damages from the landlord, and if
so, what shall be the measure?
The existence of a covenant for quiet enjoyment by implication in the estate for years, which Johnson conveyed to Bicldey,
has not been denied by counsel for the defendant, nor in view of
the abundance of authority to the contrary, could he have successfully done so.
In Pa., in every lease there is an implied covenant for quiet enjoyment, and this rule applies even to a parol
lease. Maule vs. Ashemead, 20 Pa. 482. In Duff vs. Wilson 69
Pa. 316 Mr. Justice Sharwood said: "In every lease there is an
implied covenant of quiet enjoyment." To the same effect is
Ross vs. Dysart, 33 Pa. 452; Lanigan vs. Kille, 97 Pa. 120; Kernmer vs. Midland Oil & Drilling Co., 229 Fed. 880. The facts before us state; "Johnson 'let' a building and lot to Bicldey." Though
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a few states hold that the word, "demise," is necessary for the
implication of a covenant for quiet enjoyment, and that "let" and
"lease" are insufficient, such is clearly not the law of Pa., 20 Pa.
482 nor is it in accord with the current of modern decisions in
this country, Tiffany on R. P., page 96.
The court has deemed it proper to point out the law on the
existance of implied covenants for quiet enjoyment in leases,
though, as previously said, the existence of such a covenant in
this case was not contested.
We now turn to the first of the
questions propounded in the introductory of this opinion, viz., was
there such a breach for which the plaintiff can recover?
In
Einfeld vs. Shei-er, 56 Pa. Sup. 4, the facts of which are identical with those before us, with but one exception, whcih we w~ill
son distinguish and then endeavor to establish that, neverthless,
it is not such a material difference as would cause us to vary the
measure of damages, it was stated that "this implied covenant
for quiet enjoyment is as against everybody, that is, against both
paramount and derivative titles," Mr. Tiffany on his work on
Real Property is silent on the point that an implied covenant is
as against a derivative title as well as against a paramount title,
and that a tenant has, at least, a technical right of action against
his lanlord in case of eviction under a derivative title, though he
states at several places, page 97 and page 909 that "to constitute
a breach, there must be an eviction of a lessee either actual or
constructive, by the lessor, or by some person having a paramount
title."
In Einfeld vs. Shermer, supra the purchaser at the foreclosure sale was a third party, and not the mortgagor, who was
also the plaintiff's lessor. By the deed to him under the sheriff's
sale the legal title passed directly to him from the mortgagee,
in whom the legal title is under the law of Pa., in case of a mortgage. Though a mortgagee seldom aserts his right to enter into
possession of the mortgaged land, it, nevertheless, exists.
In
view of these facts it was stated in Einfeld vs. Shermer, that the
eviction was under a title paramount tb that of the landlord.
But in the case at bar the purchaser at the foreclosure sale
was the mortgagor, Johnson. By the deed to him the legal title
revested in him, and he became again entitled to the right of entry, subject, however, to the lease to Bickley.
Consequently,
when Johnson conveyed by deed to his purchaser for $20,000.00,
the eviction by the purchaser was under a derivative title-and not
under a paramount title. Accepting Judge Morrison's view, in
Einfeld vs. Shermer, that the implied covenant for quiet enjoyment
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is applicable against a derivative title, we accordingly hold that
Bickley, has, at least, a technical right of action against Johnson
the measure of damages to be considered now.
Counsel for the plaintiff has diligently and accurately presented to the court the various rulings on the measure of damages recoverable for breach of implied covenant for quiet enjoyment-by reason, however, of eviction under title paramount.
We have already decided that the eviction in this case was under
a derivative title, and that in this respect the argument of the
counsel for the plaintiff was without foundation.
The question
which now confronts us is, does the fact that the eviction was under a derivative title, instead of a title paramount, change the
measure of damages? We are inclined to say it does not. Stress
is not so much upon the nature of the title under which the
tenant was evicted as upon the facts that he was evicted; that
he suffered damage thereby; and that the eviction was procured,
instigated, assisted, or expedited by the lanlord. Johnson and his
prospective buyer could just as well have entered into an agreement similar to that between the landlord and Krengel, the
prospective buyer in Einfeld vs. Shermer, with the same result,
viz., the sale of the property, and the accomplishment of the
landlord's fradulent desire to put the buyer in a position to obtain immediate possession of the property, should he so desire.
The facts of this case preclude any denial that Johnson instigated, procured, and expedited the eviction, and that he was guilty
of fraud ,artifice and collusion in the matter. He purposely refused to pay the interest on the mortgage in order that the mortgagee might be induced to foreclose. Though the mortgage debt
is not stated, it is very probable that the income, $1,000.00, per
year, was more than sufficient to pay the interest. Nor does it
appear that Johnson was in straightened circumstances, for he
became the purchaser at the foreclosure sale.
In view of the above we feel constrained to apply the same
iule as to the measure of damages as was applied in Einfeld vs.
Shermer, where the eviction was under title paramount, namely,
"In N. Y. and Pa., if the eviction be under title apramount, owing to the defect in the landlord's title, the defendant can recover only actual expenditures, but not the loss of the value of
the term, but if the eviction is aided, instigated, assisted, procured
or expedited by the landlord, or if the landlord is guilty of fraud,
artifice or collusion in the matter, the measure of damages becomes the difference between the rentable marketable value of
the property at the time of the eviction and the rAnt under the
lease, Lanigan vs. Kille, 97 Pa., 120; Mack vs. Patehin, 42 N. Y.
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167; Friedland vs. Myers, 139 N. Y. 432; Einfeld vs. Shermer, 56
Pa Supr. 4.
The several arguments by the counsel for the defendant
against the plaintiff's right to recover damages can not be upheld. It is well decided in Pa., that the knowledge of the lessee
that there is an outstanding encumbrance on the demised premises
does not prevent a recovery for breach of the implied covenant
for quiet enjoyment. A lessee has the right to assume that his
lessor will protect his tenancy, Funk vs. Voneida et al, Executors,
11 S. & R. 109; Memmert vs. McKeen, 112 Pa. 315; Wilson vs.
Sale, 41 Pa. Supr. 566.
It is not necessary that the eviction be actual to constitute
a breach of the implied covenant for quiet enjoyment; it is enough
that it be constructive, as where the lessee, instead of yielding
possession, buys in the hostile claimant's title, or accepts a new
lease from such claimant; Tiffany on R. P. pages 910, 911. In
this case the eyiction was constructive, Bickley choosing to attorn
Verdict and
to the purchaser rather than surrender possession.
- adgment for the plaintiff for $5,500.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The learned opinion of the court below, well disposes of the
various questions which the case presents. That the tenant had
a right to recover as compensation the value of his tenancy, that
is, the difference between the rental value of the land if that exceeded the $1000 which the lease required him to pay, and the
$1000, is we think clear. Einfeild v. Shermer.
No evidence however has been offered of the rental value of
the land. The new lease made by the purchaser at the execution
The rent stipulated for in it
sale is not evidence of that value.
might be greater or less than the normal. In agreeing to pay it,
In 56 Sup. 4 the adthe plaintiff may have been improvident.
mission of the lease of the execution purchaser, Apfelbaum, to
show the annual value of the lease $1350 was sanctioned, because
it was not offered, nor admitted as proof of the rental value of the
premises, but it was admitted for the purpose of limiting the
For the
amount which the plaintiff could recover to that sum.
limited purpose for which it was admitted by fhe court says,
Morrison, J., "we think it was proper."
In this case the learned court has allowed a recovery of
$5500, assuming apparently, that the rental under the new lease
was the fair rental value of the premises. This makes a reversal
necessary.
REVERSED.
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CHANDLER vs. ATKINS
Subjacent Support-Adverse Possession Mineral Lands-Severance of Surface from Underlying Strata-License to Let Down the
Surface-The Right to Let Down the Surface May Be Conveyed
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A, owned a coal tract. He leased it reserving the coal and
the right to extract all of it without liability for the caving in of
the surface to B., for 75 years. B took possession which in two
years he relinquished. Shortly thereafter C without right took
possession which he has retained for 30 years. A has mined the
coal and caused a cave in of the surface. C. claiming the surface
by adverse possession claims also the natural right to the support
of the surface. A. contended that all C. required by adverse possession was B's right.
Cohen, for plaintiff.
Bartram, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
KELCHNER, J., It is well settled by numerous authorities
both in this state and in England, that, where a severance of the
surface from the underlying strata of coal or other minerals has
taken place, no possession of the surface constitutes any possession of the underlying strata. Plummer v. Hillside Coal and Iron
Co., 160 Pa. 483; Kingsley v. Hillside Coal and Iron Co., 144 Pa.
613; 183 Pa. 66; 37 Pa. 430; Humphries v. Brogden, 1 Law &
Equity R. 241; Comyn v. Wheatly, Cro Jac. 150; Stoughton v.
Leigh, 4 Taunt. 402. Armstrong v. Caldwell, 33 Pa. 284.
Each estate may be occupied, conveyed, incumbered, or allotted in partition, without any effect upon the other. If a trespasser enters either estate and maintains possession he can acquire title by the statute of limitations after twenty-one years to
so much as he has actually held for that length of time but his
title will not extend above or below the estate on which he enters.
The essentials to constitute adverse possession, are, actual
possession which shall be open and notorious, continuous, exclusive
and hostile.
3 Kerr on Real Property 2292; Griffin v. Mulley,
167 Pa. 340.
The defendant who was the owner of the land leased it reserving the coal and the right to extract "all" of it without liability for the caving in of the surface. A severance of the surface from the underlying estate was thereby effected. A lease
granting "all" of the coal under a tract of land is construed as
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a sale of the coal in place. Leap v. Leaky, 67 Superior, 341. Alihough the owner of the surface is prima facie the owner of the
minerals beneath the surface and a general conveyance of the
land will carry the minerals, so the owner of land may segregate
one from the other by a conveyance or instrument in writing so
that there is a complete severance of title and separate estates
are created. Caldwell v. Copeland, 37 Pa. 427; Armstrong v.
Caldwell, 53 Pa. 284; Scranton v. Phillips, 94 Pa. 15; Hosack v.
Crill, 204 Pa. 97.
A mine right severed from the ownership of the soil, may
be regarded as a separate close, and compared to the lower story
of a building. The law implies an obligation on his part to keep
it in a suitable condition to support the upper stories owned by
others, and that the owner of the upper story shall maintain the
roof for the protection of those owning below him.
There is
however nothing in this implied duty and obligation to prevent
either from being relieved therefrom by agreement with the
other. Turner v. Reynolds, 11 Harris 199; Monongahela Coal and
Coke Co. v. Hines, 64 Sup. 12; Butterhnowle Colliery Co. Ltd. v.
Bishop Auckland, 94 L. T. 793: Held: Whenever the minerals
belong to one person and the surface to another, the law presumes that the surface owner has a right to support unless the
language of the instrument regulating their rights clearly show
the contrary. In order to exclude a right to support, the language
used must unequivocally convey that intention.
hile the owner of the surface is entitled as of natural right
to its support by the owner of the subjacent mineral estate, it is
wvell settled in Pennsylvania that the common owner of both estates or the owner of the fee title to the tract of land, may by
contract relieve the owner of the mineral estate from any duty to
support the surface and from any liability for injury or damage
done to it by mining and removing all the minerals. Being the
common owner of the whole title and therefore having the jus
disponendi he may make any legal disposition of the property he
may desire. He may sell the coal and retain the surface or he
may sell the surface and retain the coal. In selling or leasing the
coal, he may grant such rights to the vendee or lessee as either
may desire or deem proper or necessary to remove the entire body
of coal, as well as such rights in, through or over the surface as
may be necessary for' the same purpose. This naturally and
logically follows from his ownership of the fee simple title to the
property. Miles v. Penna. Coal C., 217 Pa. 451. In Weakland v.
Cymbria Coal Co., 262 Pa. 403, the action was trespass to recover
damages for injuries to the surface of coal land caused by defen-
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dant's mining operation. Held: The grantee of coal underlying
the surface incurs no liability for injuries to the surface by mining operations where the grant provides that it should not be liable for damages for failure to support the surface.
Whether or not the plaintiff has the right of surface support
in the land is the question in controversy?
Counsel for the plaintiff cites, Hart v. Williams, 189 Pa. 31;
to support his contention that the plaintiff has the right to surface support, which case we believe does not bear upon the question at issue. The plaintiff claiming the surface by adverse possession claims also the natural right to the support of the surface.
The law is firmly established in Pennsylvania that, in the absence of express waiver or the use of words from which the intention to waive clearly appears the grantee or lessee of minerals
takes the estate subject to the burden of surface support. The
right to surface support is not to be taken away by a mere implication from language which does not necessarily import such a
result. Jones v. Wagner, 66 Pa. 434; Williams v. Hays, 120 Pa.
496 Robertson v. Youghiogheny Coal Co., 172 Pa. 566; Penman v.
Jones, 256 Pa. 416.
The lessee of the surface, B. by express words in the lease,
namely: "without liability for caving in of the surface"--waived
his right to surface support. This right was vested in the defendant, the leasor. It was a valuable right and the owner could do
with it as he pleased. In the present ease, the acceptance by B,
the lessee, of the lease containing the stipulation that the leasor
should retain the right to remove the coal without liability for
caving in of the surface was merely a waiver by him as purchaser
of the surface, of his natural right or easement. The stipulation
for the right to remove the coal without liability for the caving in
of the surface did not have the etiect of retaining in the grantor
any interest outside of the coal, in the land which was being conveyed. It did not authorize the grantor to do anything upon the
land of the surface owner, but its effect was merely to absolve the
owner of the coal from responsibility for injurious consequences
which might follow the removal of the coal. The stipulation may
fairly be considered as being a license to do the desired act, that
is, to let down the surface, if necessary, in order to remove the
coal. It was authority to do an act affecting the land, making the
action lawful which without it would be unlawful.
It is equally well established, that the right to let down the
surface may by express contract, be vested in the owner of the
mineral estate. Scranton v. Phillips, 94 Pa. 15; Madden v. Lehigh
Valley Coal Co., 212 Pa. 63; Miles v. Penna. Coal Co., 217 Pa. 449;
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Kellert v. Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal & Iron Co., 226 Pa. 27;
Stilley v. Pitsburgh, Buffalo Co., 234 Pa. 492; Kirwin V. D. L. &
W. R. R. Co., 249 Pa. 98; Miles v. New York S. & W. Coal Co.,
250 Pa. 147; Penman v. Jones, 256 Pa. 416; 100 At. 1043.
In Penman v. Jones, 256 Pa. 416. The facts were: A, owned
in fee a tract of land, it conveyed to X, a lot, excepting and reserving to the grantor, its successors and assigns, "all the coal
and minerals beneath the surface of, and belonging to said lot,
with the sole right and privilege to mine and remove the same
without thereby incurring any liability for injury caused or damage done to the surface of said lot. "By mesne conveyances all
the rights of X, in and to the lot became vested in the plaintiff.
Later A conveyed to B all the coal and minerals beneath the
surface of the plaintiff's lot and other lands, together with the
right to mine and remove the coal. But the need contained no
provision that the coal could be removed without liability for damage done to the surface.
Some years later, A. conveyed to Y, who in turn conveyed to
X, all its right, title and interest in and to the lot previously conveyed to X, with the further recital that it was the purpose and
intent of this indenture to vest in the grantee, the right or privilege of surface support hitherto withheld.
Held: The right to remove the coal without liability for injury to the surface, which A, retained was something which it
eould retain or dispose of. This right to surface support was
vested in the plaintiff. The rights of B. were limited and it could
not remove the coal without liability for injury to the surface.
We therefore hold that the right to let down the surface was
vested in the defendant. The title acquired by the plaintiff to the
surface, claiming by adverse possession, did not divest the defendant of his right. The defendant, Atkins, may mine and remove
all of the coal without being compelled to support the surface.
Judgment for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Atkins, the owner of the land leased the surface to B, for 75
years. B, having taken possession, relinquished it in two years.
He did not surrender the lease. Chandler without right, took
possession of the surface. The only one who could dispute the
right to be there was B, and it is only B's title that Chandler
would acquire by adverse possession. That he did acquire a title
to the lease for the remainder of the term, is apparently clear.
There is no evidence whether rent was payable and was paid, or
not, nor that any forfeiture of the lease was make by Atkins.
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The lessee held the land subject to the risk of the disturbance
of the surface by mining operations. The transfer of the lease
to Chanlder by the adverse possession, cannot give him rights
greater than those of the person whose estate he has tortiously
acquired.
If in some way, the lease has become extinct, and the posession of Chandler has been adverse to Atkins the owner of the
fee in the surface, as the contract right as against the lessee, to
cause sinking of the surface would have ceased with the lease,
and with the common ownership both of the coal and of the surface, Chandler would have a right to the exemption of the surBut as we
face from disturbance, by the mining operations.
have said, nothing warrants the inference that more than the lessee's right has been acquired by Chandler, and as against that
•--%rt, defendant is irresponsible for the subversion of the ground.
Cf., Catholic Congregation v. Coal Co., 221 Pa. 349.
The judgment is affirmed.

